


Oguzkaan Schools

JMUN

Disarmament Committee

The United Nations logo is centered on the page. It features a world map with latitude and longitude lines, surrounded by a laurel wreath. The logo is rendered in a light blue color against a dark blue background.

Issue : Measures to Eliminate
the Use of Chemical
Weapons

Forum: Disarmament Committee

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I. Introduction

As warfare and terrorism evolves, new methods of attack weapons are being developed and utilized. One of these weapon types is chemical weapons. Chemical weapons are one of the most dangerous weapon types in the globe. As we understand from its name; chemical weapons are made of chemical mixtures. These chemical mixtures can be placed in bullets, missiles, bombs and discarded into a zone or directly to a living organism. And it causes a lot of damage.

As we mentioned before, chemical weapons are not only thrown to living organisms. They can be thrown into a zone to cause chemical damage on structures, block opponent's roads, cause mass death and destruction. It happens very painfully and makes soldiers and innocent people suffer. So, countries and councils like UN, NATO ect. are taking measures to eliminate the use of chemical weapons.

II. Definition of Key Words

Chemical Mixture: In chemistry, a mixture is a material made up of two or more different substances which are physically combined.

Living organism: In biology, an organism is any individual entity that exhibits the properties of life.

To Suffer: To experience physical or mental pain .

Mass destruction: Death or injury on a large scale, especially as caused by nuclear, biological or chemical weapons.

CWC : The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is an arms control treaty that outlaws the production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and their precursors. The full name of the treaty is the

“Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction”. It is administered by the “Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons “(OPCW).

OPCW: The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is an intergovernmental organisation and the implementing body for the Chemical Weapons Convention, which entered into force on 29 April 1997. The OPCW, with its 193 member states, has its seat in The Hague, Netherlands, and oversees the global endeavour for the permanent and verifiable elimination of chemical weapons.

Sarin: It is a kind of poisonous gas.

CWPF: Chemical Weapons Production Facility

CWDF: Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility

CWSF: Chemical Weapons Storage Facility

ACW: Abandoned Chemical Weapons

Precursor: Something that happened or existed before another thing, especially if it either developed into it or had an influence on it.

Dual-use chemical: The term “dual-use chemical” is applied to a substance that can be used for both beneficial and harmful purposes.

Scheduled Chemicals: Scheduled chemicals, which are explicitly specified in the Convention for monitoring purposes, include chemical warfare agents and their key precursors.

Non Scheduled Chemicals: Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemicals (DOCs). An unscheduled discrete organic chemical (DOCs) refers to any chemical that belongs to the class of chemical compounds consisting of all compounds of carbon, except for its oxides, sulfides and metal carbonates.

Rapid Response and Assistance Mission (RRAM): The Rapid Response and Assistance Mission (RRAM) was established in May 2016. The RRAM

is deployed upon request of a State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention that is in need of emergency assistance due to a chemical attack

III. Recent Chemical Attacks

Douma Chemical Attack

On 7 April 2018, a chemical warfare attack was carried out in the Syrian city of Douma. It is reported, according to medics and witnesses, to have resulted in the deaths of between 40 and 50 people and injuries to possibly many more than a hundred. The attack was attributed to the Syrian Army by rebel forces in Douma, and by the United States, British, and French governments.

On 14 April 2018, the United States, France and the United Kingdom carried out a series of military strikes against multiple government sites in Syria. On 6 July 2018, an interim report was issued by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Various chlorinated organic chemicals were found in samples, along with residues of explosive. But the designated laboratory stated that no CWC- scheduled chemicals or nerve agent related chemicals were detected. In **September 2018** the UN Commission of Enquiry on Syria reported:

“Throughout **7 April**, numerous aerial attacks were carried out in Douma, striking various residential areas.” A vast body of evidence consequences collected by the Commission suggests that, at approximately 7.30 p.m., a gas cylinder containing a chlorine payload delivered by helicopter struck a multi-storey residential apartment building located approximately 100 metres south-west of Shohada square. The Commission received information on the death of at least 49 individuals, and the wounding of up to 650 others.

The OPCW said it found no evidence to support the government claim that a local facility was being used by rebel fighters to produce chemical weapons.

Aftermath and Consequences

The day after the chemical attack, all rebels controlling Douma agreed to a deal with the government to surrender the area.

In the early hours of **9 April 2018**, an airstrike was conducted against Tiyas Military Airbase. Two Israeli jets reportedly attacked the airfield from Lebanese airspace, firing eight missiles, of which five were intercepted, according to claims by Russia. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights monitor, at least 14 people were killed and more were wounded. Al-Masdar News reported seven Iranian soldiers among the dead.

On **10 April**, member states proposed competing UN Security Council resolutions to handle the response to the chemical attack. The U.S. France, and UK vetoed a Russian-proposed UN resolution. Russia had also vetoed the U.S. and proposed a resolution to create a new investigative mechanism to look into chemical weapons attacks in Syria and determine who is responsible.

On **14 April**, France, the United Kingdom and the United States launched airstrikes against four Syrian government targets in response to the attack. The airstrikes were claimed to successfully destroy the chemical weapons capabilities of Syria. Nevertheless, according to Pentagon, the Syrian Arab Republic still retains the ability to launch chemical weapons attacks.

Khan Shaykhun Chemical Attack

The Khan Shaykhun chemical attack took place on **4 April 2017** on the town of Khan Shaykhun in the Idlib Governorate of Syria. The town was reported to have been struck by an airstrike by government forces followed by massive civilian chemical poisoning. The release of a toxic gas, which included **sarin**, or a similar substance, killed at least 89 people and injured more than 541, according to the opposition Idlib Health Directorate. The attack was the deadliest use of chemical weapons in the Syrian civil war since the Ghouta chemical attack in **2013**. The OPCW-UN Joint

Investigative Mechanism, indicated the responsibility of the Syrian regime for the attack.

The OPCW-UN JIM described marker chemicals that linked sarin was used against to the Syrian government: “The samples from Khan Shaykhun contain the three types of marker chemicals described above: PF6 [HFP], isopropyl phosphates and isopropyl phosphorofluoridates. Their presence is a strong indicator that the sarin disseminated in Khan Shaykhun was produced from the Syrian Arab Republic stockpile.”

The governments of the United States, United Kingdom, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, France, and Israel, as well as Human Rights Watch attributed the attack to the forces of the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The Syrian government said the attack was a fabrication. The Russian government claimed that the incident was staged.

On **7 April**, the United States launched 59 cruise missiles at Shayrat Air Base, which U.S. intelligence claimed was the source of the attack.

IV. OPCW (ORGANIZATION OF PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS) AT A GLANCE OPCW

History was made on 29 April 1997 with the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)—the world’s first multilateral disarmament agreement to provide for the elimination of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction within a fixed time frame.

The OPCW strives to fulfil the Convention’s mandate to end the development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons; to prevent their re-emergence; to ensure the elimination of existing stocks of such weapons; and, in so doing, to make the world safe from the threat of chemical warfare.

The Preparatory Commission

In 1993, Signatory States in Paris knew that a considerable amount of groundwork needed to be done before an international organisation capable

of implementing the “Chemical Weapons Convention” could be established. Fortunately, the Convention provided that its entry into force was to occur at least two years after being opened for signature and only after 180 days had elapsed from the deposit of the 65th instrument of ratification. This left open a period of time in which such preparations could be made. In what was called the Paris Resolution, the Signatory States decided to set up a Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) with a mandate to make the necessary preparations for the first Conference of the States Parties and to continue work on issues that remained unresolved by the Convention’s negotiators. The PrepCom held its first Plenary Session in The Hague in February 1993 and established a Provisional Technical Secretariat.

The PrepCom was successful in resolving a number of tasks within its mandate, the results of which were reflected in its Final Report. Among its major achievements were solutions to several substantive verification issues as well as the setting up of the OPCW Laboratory and Equipment Store, the development of a general training scheme for inspectors and the recruitment of inspector trainees, arrangements relating to the new OPCW headquarters building, and the development of draft documents, such as the Headquarters Agreement, the Staff and Financial Regulations, the Health and Safety Policy and Regulations, the Policy on Confidentiality, and the Media and Public Affairs Policy. The PrepCom was also responsible for the transfer of its property, functions and recommendations to the OPCW.

The OPCW

As provided for in the Convention, the OPCW consists of three main bodies: the Conference of the States Parties, the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat. All three bodies entered into existence facing imposing work agendas. The Conference of the States Parties, composed of representatives of all States Parties to the Convention, held its first session beginning on 6 May 1997, one week after entry into force of the CWC. In short, the OPCW has emerged as a new type of global, treaty-based

international organisation with responsibilities for disarmament and non-proliferation, among others, and with impartial mechanisms necessary to verify compliance and to redress situations of non-compliance, should they occur. In 2013, in recognition of its extensive efforts to eliminate chemical weapons, the OPCW was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, and in 2017, it commemorated its 20th anniversary.

OPCW by Numbers

- 193 States committed to the Chemical Weapons Convention
- 98% of the global population live under the protection of the Convention
- 97% of the chemical weapons stockpiles declared by possessor States have been verifiably destroyed. Some information about (EIF) is presented as follows:

As of 29.04.1997, Member states parties to the convention:93;

Signatory States: 1

Non-signatory states: 3

Table-1 Stockpile Destruction data (As of 30 September 2019)

Number	World's declared chemical weapons stockpiles(%)	Total declared stockpiles of chemical agents(metrictonnes)	Total destroyed stockpiles of chemical agents(metrictonnes)
1	97.33	72.	70,372

Table-2 Stockpile Destruction data. (As of 30 September 2019).

Number	State	CWPF	CWDF	CWSF	ACW
1	Declared	97	1913	-	-
2	Destroyed	74	1	-	-
3	Converted for Peaceful Purpose	23	2	-	-
4	Remaining inspectable facilities/sites	12	-	6	24
5	States with inspectable facilities/sites	5	-	1	1
6	Inspections since EIF	511	-	511	145

*As of 30 September 2019

Table-3 Stockpile Destruction data. (As of 30 September 2019)

	2021	2022	2023
Inspections Since EIF	312	902	504
States With Declared Plant Sites	23	23	33

Inspactable Plant Sites	26	212	354
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Table-4 Other Chemical Production Facilities (OCPF)* (As of 30 September 2019)

	Number
Inspections Since EIF	2289
States With Declared Plant Sites	80
Inspactable Plant Sites	4270

V. Comprehensive Implementing

States with national implementing legislation covering some initial measures of the Convention: 32

“To exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons”

The Chemical Weapons Convention’s aim is “to exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons”. It does so by ensuring that all existing stockpiles of chemical weapons are destroyed, and by putting in place a framework – made up of a set of binding obligations on States Parties and a verification regime run by the Technical Secretariat – to ensure that chemical weapons do not re-emerge.

Chemical weapons may re-emerge in a number of ways: through state-sponsored programmes, through the actions of terrorist or other criminal

groups, or through lone individuals. Chemical weapons may be produced by repurposing existing chemical facilities or they may be made on a smaller scale in purpose-built laboratories or even domestic settings. The OPCW works in a variety of ways to prevent these scenarios from happening.

The Use Of Verification

Toxic chemicals are used around the world for many legitimate and peaceful applications, but they may also be used for purposes that are prohibited by the “Chemical Weapons Convention”. Because of this, States Parties to the “Chemical Weapons Convention” must ensure that all toxic chemicals, and their precursors, are only used for purposes that are not prohibited by the Convention. This is a very broad obligation, which may involve a number of actions at the national level relating to matters such as chemical security, criminalisation of prohibited conduct, and the creation of a National Authority for Convention implementation.

As part of this commitment, States Parties to the Convention have obligations relating to certain toxic chemicals listed in the Convention, that could be used for weapons purposes. These obligations involve the collection of information and the submission of declarations regarding these chemicals, which are of varying commercial significance.

Dual use chemical—Any chemical that has legitimate peaceful uses but which may also be used to make chemical weapons is a dual-use chemical.

Thiodiglycol, for example, is both an ingredient in pen ink, as well as a precursor to mustard agents.

Hydrogen cyanide, which is itself a potent toxic agent may also be used to make the nerve agent tabun, is commonly used in the manufacture of nylon.

Cyanides may also be found in dyes and pigments.

Phosphorus trichloride is a precursor to chemicals that can be used to make VX, another nerve agent, but it is also used to produce lubricants and pesticides.

Equipment in certain chemical production facilities can even be considered dual-use in the sense that it may be converted to produce chemical weapons or their precursors.

Controlling International Transfers of Chemicals

States Parties to the Convention also have obligations when they export or import scheduled chemicals. There are two basic elements to the Convention's regime concerning international transfers of chemicals: monitoring transfers between States Parties, and restrictions on trade with non-States Parties.

In brief, 2021 and 2022 chemicals may only be transferred between States Parties to the Convention. 2023 chemicals may only be transferred to non-States Parties if the recipient provides an end-use certificate and pledges not to transfer them onward. All transfers of scheduled chemicals must be declared to the OPCW Technical Secretariat.

VI. Challenge Inspections

Challenge inspections are designed to clarify and resolve any questions concerning possible non-compliance by a State Party with the "Chemical Weapons Convention" and are one of its most innovative features. Under Article IX of the Convention, **any State Party can request the Secretariat to conduct an on-site challenge inspection anywhere in the territory (or under the jurisdiction or control) of any other State Party.** States Parties may not refuse a challenge inspection, regardless of the nature of the location at which it is to take place. Article IX encourages, but does not oblige, States Parties to try to clarify and resolve non-compliance concerns through consultations before requesting a challenge inspection. Challenge inspections are characterised by the 'any time, any place' concept: they are to be launched at very short notice and can be directed at declared or undeclared facilities and locations.

Dealing with the Threat of Terrorism

The threat of terrorists using chemicals as weapons is a significant global challenge. OPCW Member States have long recognised the threat posed to the “Chemical Weapons Convention” by non-State actors, and have underlined that the full and effective implementation of all provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention is in itself a contribution to global counter-terrorism efforts. While the Chemical Weapons Convention was not designed specifically to deal with terrorism, it contains a number of provisions that can help countries to control access to toxic chemicals and related materials, and to respond effectively should the worst occur.

Prevention

Key to preventing chemical terrorism is ensuring that terrorists cannot easily access the chemicals they seek. “The Chemical Weapons Convention” requires its States Parties to “adopt the necessary measures” to ensure that toxic chemicals and their precursors are only used for non-prohibited purposes. The implementation of this obligation involves ensuring compliance with the requirements of the Convention’s verification regime in relation to scheduled chemicals, but it also involves putting in place controls, where considered necessary, on scheduled or “non-scheduled” chemicals that are susceptible to being used as weapons or in the manufacture of chemical weapons. An example of a “non-scheduled” chemical of security concern is **chlorine**, which is in very wide industrial use around the world but has also been used recently as a chemical weapon. Possible examples of such ‘necessary measures’ include policies to ensure the security and to limit the risk of diversion of vulnerable chemicals (such as chemicals or precursor chemicals that may likely be used by non-State actors), including declaration and reporting requirements, codes of practice, export controls, and so forth.

The OPCW assists its Member States in this task by serving as a platform for the exchange of information about best practices and by providing capacity building.

Response

The Convention facilitates the exchange among States Parties of information and equipment which can help to protect populations against the effects of a chemical weapon-attack. It also mandates the Technical Secretariat to provide assistance to States Parties that request it. The OPCW's "Rapid Response and Assistance Mission" (RRAM) fulfills this task, and can be utilized upon request of a State Party to the "Chemical Weapons Convention" that is in need of emergency assistance due to a chemical attack.

Comprised of a group of experts from the OPCW Technical Secretariat, the RRAM possesses capabilities to provide advice on a range of different scenarios that may occur during a chemical attack. The RRAM can also support a State Party in coordinating response efforts with other international organisations.

VII. The OPCW's Counter-Terrorism Efforts

The OPCW has a range of capacity building programmes that help Member States to prevent and respond to chemical terrorism. These range from legal workshops to first-response training. The OPCW also works actively with the United Nations and other international organisations to ensure a coordinated response in times of emergency.

Awareness through Education and Outreach

One of the most important ways the OPCW works to prevent the re-emergence of chemical weapons is by increasing knowledge and awareness about chemical weapons, about the work of the OPCW and the goals of the CWC, and about the importance of responsible scientific practice.

VIII. The Hague Ethical Guidelines

Ensuring an Ethos of Science for Peace to promote a culture of responsible conduct in the chemical sciences and to guard against the misuse of chemistry, a group of chemical practitioners from around the world have formulated a set of ethical guidelines informed by the "Chemical Weapons

Convention”– The Hague Ethical Guidelines. The Hague Ethical Guidelines are intended to serve as elements for ethical codes and discussion points for ethical issues related to the practice of chemistry under the Convention. The OPCW encourages all stakeholders to refer to and promote the guidelines when debating the vital dimension of ethics in relation to chemical disarmament and non-proliferation and the broader issue of responsible scientific conduct.

IX. Chair’s Notes

If you want to get more information about chemical attacks, we suggest you to visit;

<https://www.wikizeroo.org/index.php?q=aHR0cHM6Ly91bi53aWtpcGVkaWEub3JnL3dpa2kvRG91bWFfY2h1bWljYWxfYXR0YWNR> site for Douma Chemical Attack,

<https://www.wikizeroo.org/index.php?q=aHR0cHM6Ly91bi53aWtpcGVkaWEub3JnL3dpa2kvS2hhbl9TaGF5a2h1bg> site for Khan Shaykhun Chemical Attack.

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The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

<https://www.opcw.org/>.

Turkish Republic Foreign Affairs

<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/controllingweapons>